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Abstract
We study multistep Bayesian betting strategies in coin-tossing games in the
framework of game-theoretic probability of Shafer and Vovk (2001). We show that
by a countable mixture of these strategies, a gambler or an investor can exploit
arbitrary patterns of deviations of nature’s moves from independent Bernoulli trials.
We then apply our scheme to asset trading games in continuous time and derive the
exponential growth rate of the investor’s capital when the variation exponent of the
asset price path deviates from two.
Keywords and phrases: Beta-binomial distribution, Ho¨lder exponent, Kullback divergence,
randomness, risk neutral probability, universal prior.
1 Introduction
The field of game-theoretic probability and finance established by Shafer and Vovk [12] has
been rapidly developing in many directions. The present authors have been contributing
to this exciting new field by focusing mainly on explicit strategies of the gambler and the
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growth rate of his capital ([14], [15], [6], [7], [8], [13], [5], [16]). Following the terminology
of Shafer and Vovk [12], we refer to the gambler as Skeptic or Investor (Section 4) and
refer to nature as Reality or Market (Section 4).
In this paper we extend the results of [7] and [16] by considering multistep Bayesian
strategies. In [7] we considered a class of Bayesian strategies for Skeptic in coin-tossing
games, strategies that were based only on the past average of Reality’s moves. We proved
the important fact that if Skeptic uses a Bayesian strategy and Reality violates the strong
law of large numbers (SLLN), then the exponential growth rate of the Skeptic’s capital
process is very accurately described in terms of the Kullback divergence between the
average of Reality’s moves when she violates SLLN and the average when she observes
SLLN. Furthermore in [16] we applied Bayesian strategies for coin-tossing games to asset
trading games in continuous time. If we discretize a continuous-time game by an equi-
spaced grid in the state space (i.e. the vertical axis), then the continuous time game can
be approximated by an embedded coin-tossing game. Thus the results of discrete time
coin-tossing games can be applied to continuous-time games. In particular we gave a
proof of “
√
dt-effect”, i.e., Investor can force Market to choose a price path with variation
exponent equal to two, within an arbitrary small constant.
More generally, discretization of continuous-time game in [16] is based on the re-
quirement that Investor choose a countable number of discrete stopping times against
a continuous path chosen by Market. This approach allows us to formulate and study
continuous-time games in game-theoretic probability within the conventional theory of
analysis, whereas in the book by Shafer and Vovk continuous-time games were formu-
lated as limits of discrete time games using nonstandard analysis. Vovk has taken up this
formulation and is currently rapidly developing it in [17], [18], [19]. By these works of Vovk
it has now become clear that many measure-theoretic results on continuous-time stochas-
tic processes can be more directly derived in the framework of game-theoretic probability.
It should be emphasized that the game-theoretic approach is advantageous because no
probabilistic assumptions on the paths are imposed a priori. Instead, a stochastic behav-
ior of Market results from the protocol of the game. This has a far-reaching conceptual
implications for the emergence of probability.
In the coin-tossing games Reality may deviate from independent Bernoulli trials in a
subtle way without violating the strong law of large numbers. For example, Reality could
choose a deterministic sequence where heads and tails alternate. Then SLLN holds for this
kind of paths and they can not be prevented by Bayesian strategies in [7]. We could use
“contrarian” strategies ([5]) based on the past average of Reality’s moves for preventing
this kind of paths. However a more natural approach is to model autocorrelations between
successive moves of Reality. Note that the deterministic sequence of alternating heads
and tails can be regarded as a sequence with the first-order autocorrelation of −1. These
considerations naturally lead to multistep Bayesian strategies of the present paper. Then
by a countable mixture of these strategies Skeptic can detect and exploit arbitrary patterns
of deviations from the sequence of independent Bernoulli trials.
Our results have close relations to the ones in many fields. Universal source coding
has been extensively studied in information theory (e.g. Han and Kobayashi [4]) and the
equivalence of source coding and betting is discussed in Cover and Thomas [1]. Various
notions of randomness have been studied from the viewpoint of Kolmogorov complexity
(e.g. Li and Vita´nyi [10], Lambalgen [9]) and there exists an extensive literature on algo-
rithmic theory of randomness. See two forthcoming books on algorithmic randomness by
Downey and Hirschfeldt [2] and by Nies [11]. We discuss these relations in Section 5.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we set up notations for
the coin-tossing game and give some preliminary results. In Section 3 we consider two
types of Reality’s moves which suggest deviations from independent Bernoulli trials. The
first is a block type pattern and the second is a Markovian type pattern. We construct
Skeptic’s Bayesian strategies which can exploit these non-randomnesses. We show that
it is asymptotically always advantageous to exploit higher order patterns in Reality’s
moves. In Section 4 we consider asset trading games in continuous time and investigate
the consequences of high-frequency block type strategies and Markovian strategies. We
derive the exponential growth rate of Investor’s capital process when Market chooses a
path with variation exponent not equal to two. Finally in Section 5 we discuss some
aspects of our results and their implications for related fields.
2 Preliminaries on coin-tossing games and Bayesian
strategies
In this section we summarize preliminary results on coin-tossing games and capital process
of Bayesian strategies ([12], [7]). We also discuss a one-to-one correspondence between
the set of probability distributions on the set of Reality’s paths and the set of Skeptic’s
strategies. Finally we note the convexity of the Kullback divergence with respect to its
first argument.
In this paper we consider the coin-tossing game in the following form. In the protocol
the success probability 0 < ρ < 1 is given.
Coin-Tossing Game
Protocol:
K0 := 1.
FOR n = 1, 2, . . . :
Skeptic announces Mn ∈ R.
Reality announces xn ∈ {0, 1}.
Kn = Kn−1 +Mn(xn − ρ).
END FOR
If we write Mn =M
1
n −M0n , then Mn(xn − ρ) can be rewritten as
Mn(xn − ρ) = M1n(xn − ρ) +M0n
(
(1− xn)− (1− ρ)
)
. (1)
In this case we say that Skeptic bets M1n on xn = 1 and M
0
n on xn = 0. Although (1) is
a redundant expression, generalizations to multistep protocols in the next section can be
more transparently understood in this form. A path ξ = x1x2 . . . is an infinite sequence of
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Reality’s moves and the sample space Ξ = {ξ} = {0, 1}∞ is the set of paths. ξn = x1 . . . xn
denotes the partial path of Reality’s moves up to round n. Throughout this paper we use
the notation
sn = x1 + · · ·+ xn, x¯n = sn
n
.
Skeptic’s strategy P is a set of functions P : ξn−1 7→ Mn which determines Skeptic’s
moveMn at round n based on Reality’s moves up to the previous round ξ
n−1 = x1 . . . xn−1.
Given a strategy P
KPn (ξ) = K0 +
n∑
i=1
Mi(ξ
i−1)(xi − ρ)
denotes Skeptic’s capital process when he uses P, starting with the initial capital of
K0 = 1. Following the terminology in [17] we call P prudent if KPn (ξ) ≥ 0 for all ξ and n,
i.e., Skeptic’s capital is never negative irrespective of the moves of Reality. We also say
that Skeptic observes his collateral duty if he uses a prudent strategy. In this paper we
require that Skeptic’s strategies are prudent.
We consider probability distributions on the set of paths Ξ = {0, 1}∞. In our frame-
work a probability distribution Q on Ξ is just a collection of consistent discrete proba-
bility distributions Q = {Qn;n ≥ 1}, where Qn is a discrete probability distribution on
Ξn = {0, 1}n satisfying the consistency condition
Qn(ξ
n) = Qn+1(ξ
n0) +Qn+1(ξ
n1), ∀n, ∀ξn. (2)
Note that we do not need measure-theoretic extension of Q to a probability measure on
a σ-field of Ξ. Under the distribution Q, the conditional probability of xn = 1 given
ξn−1 = x1 . . . xn−1 with Qn−1(ξ
n−1) > 0 is written as
pQn = p
Q
n (ξ
n−1) =
Qn(ξ
n−11)
Qn−1(ξn−1)
. (3)
If Qn−1(ξ
n−1) = 0, then pQn is not defined. We call the probability distribution of i.i.d.
Bernoulli trials with success probability ρ the risk neutral measure of the coin-tossing
game.
Given a probability distribution Q, define a strategy P = PQ by
PQ : ξn−1 7→Mn = Kn−1 p
Q
n − ρ
ρ(1− ρ) . (4)
A motivation of this definition is given in Appendix. If we write Mn = M
1
n −M0n as in
(1), then M1n , M
0
n are given as
M1n = Kn−1
pQn
ρ
, M0n = Kn−1
1− pQn
1− ρ . (5)
The capital process of PQ is explicitly written as follows ([7, Theorem 4.1]).
KPQn (ξn) =
Q(ξn)
ρsn(1− ρ)n−sn . (6)
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This is the likelihood ratio of Q to the risk neutral measure at the realized path ξn up
to round n. In Appendix, we establish a one-to-one correspondence between the set of
probability distributions on Ξ and the set of prudent strategies. Therefore capital process
of a prudent strategy can always be expressed as (6).
In particular if we employ a beta-binomial distribution
Q(ξn) =
Γ(a+ b)Γ(a + sn)Γ(b+ n− sn)
Γ(a+ b+ n)Γ(a)Γ(b)
with pQn =
a + sn−1
a+ b+ n− 1 , (7)
where a, b > 0 are hyperparameters of the prior distribution, then by a simple application
of Stirling’s formula, the resulting capital process denoted by K0n behaves as
logK0n = nD(x¯n‖ρ)− O(logn), (8)
where
D(p‖q) = p log p
q
+ (1− p) log 1− p
1− q
is the Kullback divergence between two scalar probabilities p and q. Hence if x¯n deviates
from ρ, then D(x¯n‖ρ) gives the average exponential growth rate of the capital process.
We call D(x¯n‖ρ) the main growth rate (or simply the growth rate) of the log capital.
In the subsequent sections we often use the convexity of Kullback divergence for prob-
ability vectors with respect to its first argument. Let p = {pj}kj=1 and q = {qj}kj=1 be
probability vectors and let
D(p‖q) =
k∑
j=1
pj log
pj
qj
denote the Kullback divergence between p and q. Let pi = {pij}kj=1, i = 1, 2, be proba-
bility vectors and for 0 < λ < 1 let p¯ = λp1 + (1 − λ)p2 = {p¯j}kj=1. Then the following
relation is easily obtained
λD(p1‖q) + (1− λ)D(p2‖q)−D(p¯‖q) = λD(p1‖p¯) + (1− λ)D(p2‖p¯) ≥ 0. (9)
The left-hand side can also be written as
λD(p1‖q) + (1− λ)D(p2‖q)−D(p¯‖q) =
k∑
j=1
p¯jD
(λp1j
p¯j
∥∥∥λ) ≥ 0.
3 Priors for higher order patterns and multistep strate-
gies
As discussed in Section 1 there may be some deviating patterns from independent Bernoulli
trials in the Reality’s moves x1x2 . . . , although the path ξ = x1x2 . . . satisfies SLLN
limn→∞ x¯n = ρ. The strategy considered in [7] is based only on sn and it can not exploit
these patterns. Skeptic can increase his capital by strategies exploiting patterns not re-
flected in x¯n. In the following we investigate two types of such non-randomness or higher
order patterns. The first is the block type pattern and the second is the Markovian type
pattern. We give multistep Bayesian strategies which effectively exploit these patterns.
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3.1 Block patterns
For clarity of presentation, we first consider sequence of pairs (i.e. blocks of length 2) and
later generalize the results to blocks of arbitrary length.
Consider the sequence of pairs (x1x2)(x3x4) . . . (x2n−1x2n) of Reality’s moves and de-
note the number of the pairs (11), (10), (01), (00) among the first n blocks by m11n , m
10
n ,
m01n , m
00
n , respectively. If the sequence is random, i.e., the Reality’s moves are i.i.d.
Bernoulli trials with success probability ρ, then we will have
lim
n→∞
mijn
n
= ρij , i, j = 0, 1,
where ρ11 = (ρ)2, ρ10 = ρ01 = ρ(1− ρ), ρ00 = (1− ρ)2. We construct a strategy for which
lim supnKn =∞ whenever lim supn |mijn /n− ρij | > 0 at least for one (i, j).
For this purpose, at the (2n−1)-th round (n = 1, 2, . . . ) Skeptic chooses four amounts
M11n ,M
10
n ,M
01
n ,M
00
n and bet them on (x2n−1x2n) = (11), (10), (01), (00), respectively.
Then we have
K2n = K2n−2 +
∑
i,j∈{0,1}
M ijn (z
ij
n − ρij),
where
z11n = x2n−1 × x2n =
{
1, if (x2n−1x2n) = (11)
0, otherwise
and other zijn , i, j = 0, 1, are defined similarly. Thus we define a derived capital process
K∗n = K2n with the protocol
K∗n = K∗n−1 +
∑
i,j∈{0,1}
M ijn (z
ij
n − ρij), n = 1, 2, . . . , (K∗0 = 1).
As a natural generalization of the beta-binomial distribution treated in [7], let us take
the Dirichlet-multinomial distribution as Q(ξ2n) = Q(z1 . . . zn). Then the corresponding
strategy is given by (cf. (5) and (7))
M ijn = K∗n−1
mijn−1 + c
ij
ρij(n− 1 + c) , i, j = 0, 1,
where cij ’s are positive hyperparameters of the Dirichlet prior and
∑
i,j∈{0.1} c
ij = c. The
capital process K∗n = KPQ2n for this strategy is given by
K∗n =
Q(ξ2n)∏
i,j(ρ
ij)m
ij
n
=
∏
i,j Γ(m
ij
n + c
ij)/Γ(cij)(
Γ(n+ c)/Γ(c)
)∏
i,j(ρ
ij)m
ij
n
=
Γ(c)
∏
i,j Γ(m
ij
n + c
ij)∏
i,j Γ(c
ij)Γ(n+ c)
∏
i,j(ρ
ij)m
ij
n
,
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where in the products i, j range over {0, 1}.
We evaluate the asymptotic behavior of this capital. Denote mijn /n = pˆ
ij
n , i, j = 0, 1.
Then as in (8) we have
logK∗n = n
∑
i,j∈{0,1}
pˆijn log
pˆijn
ρij
− O(logn).
Hence for even n the original capital process KPQn = K∗n/2 is written as
logKPQn = logK∗n/2 =
n
2
D
({pˆijn } ∥∥ {ρij})− O(logn).
Now if we neglect the pairwise block patterns and apply the strategy of [7] based on
sn only, then corresponding capital process K0n behaves as (8). We compare KPQn and K0n.
By (9) with λ = 1/2 we have
logKPQn − logK0n =
n
2
D
(
(pˆ11n , pˆ
10
n , pˆ
01
n , pˆ
00
n )
∥∥ (ρˆ11n , ρˆ10n , ρˆ01n , ρˆ00n ))−O(logn), (10)
where ρˆ11n = (x¯n)
2, ρˆ10n = ρˆ
01
n = x¯n(1 − x¯n), ρˆ00n = (1 − x¯n)2. We see that KPQn exploits
the pairwise block type non-randomness more effectively than K0n by the amount half the
Kullback divergence given in the right-hand side of (10).
So far we have only considered even n. This is sufficient for analyzing the asymptotic
behavior of KPQn . For completeness we discuss KPQn for odd n. We can decompose Skeptic’s
bet M ijn on z
ij
n = 1 to the (2n− 1)-th round and the 2n-th round as follows.
1) at the (2n− 1)-th round, Skeptic bets ρM11n +(1− ρ)M10n on x2n−1 = 1 and ρM01n +
(1− ρ)M00n on x2n−1 = 0,
2a) if x2n−1 = 1, then at the 2n-th round he bets M
11
n on x2n = 1 and M
10
n on x2n = 0,
2b) if x2n−1 = 0, then at the 2n-th round he bets M
01
n on x2n = 1 and M
00
n on x2n = 0.
Denote mi+n =
∑1
j=0m
ij
n and c
i+ =
∑1
j=0 c
ij , i = 0, 1. Then the capital at an odd round
KPQ2n+1 is written as follows.
KPQ2n+1 = KPQ2n ×
{
(m1+n + c
1+)/(ρ(n− 1 + c)), if x2n+1 = 1
(m0+n + c
0+)/((1− ρ)(n− 1 + c)), if x2n+1 = 0
= KPQ2n ×
Γ(c)Γ(m1+n + c
1+ + x2n+1)Γ(m
0+
n + c
0+ + 1− x2n+1)
ρx2n+1(1− ρ)1−x2n+1Γ(n + c)Γ(m1+n + c1+)Γ(m0+n + c0+)
.
We can construct a similar strategy for the sequence of pairs (x2x3) . . . (x2nx2n+1) and
can also combine these two strategies by splitting the initial capital into two equal parts
and applying the corresponding strategy for each of them. Let KB = KPQ denote the
capital process considered so far and let K˜B denote the similar capital process based
on (x2x3)(x4x5) . . . . Then the capital process of the combined strategy is written as
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K = (1/2)(KB + K˜B). Hence lim supnKn = ∞, if the relative frequency of consecutive
pairs (x2n−1x2n), (x2nx2n+1), taking the value (ij) does not converge to {ρij/2} for some
(ij).
We have discussed blocks of length two for notational simplicity. The above deriva-
tion can be extended to n blocks of consecutive k-tuples, and hereafter we outline the
procedure. Let xk1,x
k
2, . . . ,x
k
n be the first n blocks of k-tuple with
x
k
m = (xk(m−1)+1, xk(m−1)+2, . . . , xkm), m = 1, . . . , n,
and let mǫkn , ǫk = ǫ1 . . . ǫk, ǫi = 1 or 0, denote the number of the consecutive k-tuple ǫk
among the first n blocks. Also denote
ρǫk = ρ
Pk
i=1 ǫi(1− ρ)k−
Pk
i=1 ǫi.
If the sequence is random, we will have limn→∞m
ǫk
n /n = ρ
ǫk for all ǫk ∈ {0, 1}k.
At the k(n− 1) + 1-st round (n = 1, 2, . . . ), Skeptic chooses 2k amounts Mǫkn and bet
them on xkn = ǫk. Then we have
Kkn = Kk(n−1) +
∑
ǫk∈{0,1}k
Mǫkn (z
ǫk
n − ρǫk),
where
zǫkn =
{
1, if xkn = ǫk
0, otherwise.
Thus the derived game K∗n = Kkn is defined with the protocol
K∗n = K∗n−1 +
∑
ǫk∈{0,1}k
Mǫkn (z
ǫk
n − ρǫk), n = 1, 2, . . . , (K∗0 = 1),
where
∑
ǫk∈{0,1}k
zǫkn = 1.
If we take the Dirichlet-multinomial distribution as Q(ξkn) = Q(zǫk1 . . . z
ǫk
n ), then the
corresponding strategy is given by
Mǫkn = K∗n−1
mǫkn−1 + c
ǫk
ρǫk(n− 1 + c) ,
where ∀cǫk > 0, ∑
ǫk∈{0,1}k
cǫk = c, are the hyperparameters of the Dirichlet prior. The
capital process for this strategy is
KPQkn = K∗n =
Q(ξkn)∏
ǫk
(ρǫk)m
ǫk
n
=
Γ(c)
∏
ǫk
Γ(mǫkn + c
ǫk)∏
ǫk
Γ(cǫk)Γ(n+ c)
∏
ǫk
(ρǫk)m
ǫk
n
.
We evaluate the asymptotic behavior of this capital. Denote mǫkn /n = pˆ
ǫk
n . Then
logK∗n = nD
({pˆǫkn } ∥∥ {ρǫk})− O(logn) = n ∑
ǫk∈{0,1}k
pˆǫkn log
pˆǫkn
ρǫk
−O(logn). (11)
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Hence in the context of the original game, for n which is a multiple of k, we have
logKPQn = logK∗n/k =
n
k
D
({pˆǫkn } ∥∥ {ρǫk})−O(logn).
Similar strategies can be constructed for the n blocks of the k-tuples with shift a
x
k
m+a = (xk(m−1)+1+a, xk(m−1)+2+a, . . . , xkm+a), 1 ≤ m ≤ n, a = 1, . . . , k − 1.
We next combine k kinds of these strategies by splitting the initial capital into k equal
parts and applying the corresponding strategy for each of them. Let Kn denote the
resulting capital process. Then lim supnKn = ∞, if for any ǫk the relative frequency of
any of xkm,x
k
m+1, . . . , x
k
m+k−1 (1 ≤ m ≤ n) taking the value ǫk does not converge to
ρǫk/k.
It is of interest to compare the growth rates of KPQn for different block lengths k.
Note that block pattern strategy of length k also depends on the shift a. If the empirical
distribution of {ǫk} is different for a, then the main growth rate of a block strategy depends
also on a. For simplicity we mainly consider the case that the empirical distribution Fn,a of
{xkm+a}nm=1 is the same for different shifts a, in the sense that the total variation distance
between Fn,a and Fn,a′ converges to 0 for all a 6= a′. We call this case “homogeneous
with respect to the shifts”. We show in Section 3.3 that the main growth rate of (11) is
non-decreasing in k under the assumption of homogeneity with respect to the shifts.
3.2 Markovian patterns
We can construct another strategy which exploits non-randomness in the moves of Reality.
Such a procedure can be given as
M1 = 0, Mn =
{
M+n , if xn−1 = 1
M−n , if xn−1 = 0
n = 2, 3, . . . ,
where M+n and M
−
n can have different values. This is a first-order Markovian strategy,
which incorporates the information on the last move xn−1 of Reality. As in the previous
subsection, for clarity of presentation we first consider the first-order Markovian strategy
and then extend it to higher-order Markovian strategies.
Let q1n = sn and q
0
n = n − sn. We also denote the numbers of pairs (xi−1xi) =
(11), (10), (01), (00), i = 2, . . . , n by q11n , q
10
n , q
01
n , q
00
n , respectively. (For n = 1, let
0 = q111 = q
10
1 = q
01
1 = q
00
1 .) We take the beta-binomial distribution with parameters
a, b > 0 for Q(xi | xi−1 = 1) and Q(xi | xi−1 = 0), i ≥ 2. (The initial distribution is taken
as Q(1) = ρ = 1−Q(0).) Then the corresponding strategy for i ≥ 2 is given by
M+i = Ki−1
p+i − ρ
ρ(1− ρ) , M
−
i = Ki−1
p−i − ρ
ρ(1− ρ) ,
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with
p+i =
q11i−1 + a
q11i−1 + q
10
i−1 + a+ b
, p−i =
q01i−1 + a
q01i−1 + q
00
i−1 + a+ b
.
For i = 1, we let M+1 =M
−
1 = 0. The capital Kn = KPQn for this strategy is given by
Kn = Γ(a+ b)Γ(q
11
n + a)Γ(q
10
n + b)
Γ(a)Γ(b)Γ(q11n + q
10
n + a+ b)ρ
q11n (1− ρ)q10n ×
Γ(a+ b)Γ(q01n + a)Γ(q
00
n + b)
Γ(a)Γ(b)Γ(q01n + q
00
n + a+ b)ρ
q01n (1− ρ)q00n
=
Γ(a+ b)2Γ(q11n + a)Γ(q
10
n + b)Γ(q
01
n + a)Γ(q
00
n + b)
Γ(a)2Γ(b)2Γ(q11n + q
10
n + a+ b)Γ(q
01
n + q
00
n + a+ b)ρ
q11n +q
01
n (1− ρ)q10n +q00n .
We evaluate the asymptotic behavior of this capital process. Write q1n/n = pˆn = x¯n,
q11n /q
1
n = r
1
n, and q
01
n /q
0
n = r
0
n. Then as in (8) we have
logKn = npˆnD(r1n‖ρ) + n(1− pˆn)D(r0n‖ρ)− O(logn). (12)
Hence if either lim supn |r1n − ρ| > 0 or lim supn |r0n − ρ| > 0 then lim supnKn =∞.
Now we compare (12) to the capital process (8) of the strategy based on sn only. By
counting the number of pairs we have q11n + q
01
n = q
1
n − x1 and
pˆnr
1
n + (1− pˆn)r0n =
q11n
n
+
q01n
n
= pˆn − x1
n
= pˆn −O(1/n).
Then by (9) with λ = pˆn we have
logKn − logK0n = n
[
pˆnD(r
1
n‖ρ) + (1− pˆn)D(r0n‖ρ)−D(pˆn‖ρ)
]
−O(logn)
= n
[
pˆnD(r
1
n‖pˆn) + (1− pˆn)D(r0n‖pˆn)
]
−O(logn). (13)
We again see that logKn exploits the first-order Markovian non-randomness more effec-
tively than logK0n by the amount given above.
The above first-order procedure can be extended to the k-th order procedure based
on sequence x˜kn−1 = xn−k . . . xn−1 of length k preceding xn. We hereafter outline the
procedure.
Let qǫkn denote the number of consecutive k-tuple ǫk in ξ
n = x1 . . . xn. For (k + 1)-
tuples ǫk1 = ǫ1 . . . ǫk1 and ǫk0 = ǫ1, . . . , ǫk0 we similarly define q
ǫk1
n and q
ǫk0
n . We take the
beta-binomial distribution for Q(xi|x˜ki−1 = ǫk), i ≥ k + 1. (The initial distribution Q(ξk)
up to round k is taken as the risk neutral measure.) The corresponding strategy is
Mi = 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, Mi =Mǫki = Ki−1
pǫki − ρ
ρ(1− ρ) , if x˜
k
i−1 = ǫk, i ≥ k + 1,
with
pǫki =
qǫk1i−1 + a
qǫk1i−1 + q
ǫk0
i−1 + a+ b
, a, b > 0.
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The capital process Kn = KPQn for this strategy is written as
Kn =
∏
ǫk∈{0,1}k
Γ(a+ b)Γ(qǫk1n + a)Γ(q
ǫk0
n + b)
Γ(a)Γ(b)Γ(qǫkn + a+ b)ρq
ǫk1
n (1− ρ)qǫk0n
=
Γ(a+ b)2
k
Γ(a)2kΓ(b)2k
∏
ǫk∈{0,1}k
Γ(qǫk1n + a)Γ(q
ǫk0
n + b)
Γ(qǫkn + a + b)ρq
ǫk1
n (1− ρ)qǫk0n
.
We evaluate the asymptotic behavior of this capital. Denote pˆM,ǫkn = q
ǫk
n /n, r
ǫk
n = q
ǫk1
n /q
ǫk
n .
Note that pˆM,ǫkn differs from pˆ
ǫk
n in (11), because the latter only looks at the relative
frequency of ǫk among non-overlapping blocks of length k. As n→∞, we have
logKn = n
∑
ǫk∈{0,1}k
pˆM,ǫkn D
(
rǫkn ‖ρ
)−O(logn). (14)
Hence if lim supn |rǫk − ρ| > 0 for any ǫk, then lim supnKn = ∞. In the next section we
show that the first term on the right-hand side of (14) is non-decreasing in k.
3.3 Relations between block strategies and Markovian strate-
gies
In (10) and (13) we saw that the block strategy of length two and the first-order Markovian
strategy have better main growth rates than the strategy based sn only. In this section
we give results on the comparison of main growth rates for general k, which is the block
size for block strategies and the order for Markovian strategies.
For Markovian strategies we show that a larger k gives a better growth rate. Con-
cerning block strategies we show that the same result holds under the assumption of
homogeneity with respect to shifts and furthermore that Markovian strategy of order
k − 1 gives a better growth rate than the block strategy of length k.
We first consider Markovian strategies. Let KM,kn denote the capital process of k-th
order Markovian strategy. In (14), for a given ǫk−1 = ǫ2 . . . ǫk consider the sum of two
terms involving 1ǫk−1 = 1ǫ2 . . . ǫk and 0ǫk−1 = 0ǫ2 . . . ǫk. We have
pˆM,1ǫk−1n + pˆ
M,0ǫk−1
n = pˆ
M,ǫk−1
n +O(1/n),
where O(1/n) is due to the counting problem at the end of the sequence ξn. Also
pˆM,1ǫk−1n r
1ǫk−1
n + pˆ
M,0ǫk−1
n r
0ǫk−1
n = pˆ
M,ǫk−1
n r
ǫk−1
n +O(1/n).
Then by (9)
pˆM,1ǫk−1n D(r
1ǫk−1
n ‖ρ) + pˆM,0ǫk−1n D(r0ǫk−1n ‖ρ)− pˆM,ǫk−1n D(r1ǫk−1n ‖ρ)
= pˆM,1ǫk−1n D(r
1ǫk−1
n ‖rǫk−1n ) + pˆM,0ǫk−1n D(r0ǫk−1n ‖rǫk−1n ) +O(1/n). (15)
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Summing up over ǫk−1 ∈ {0, 1}k−1 we have
logKM,kn − logKM,k−1n
= n
∑
ǫk−1∈{0,1}k−1
[
pˆM,1ǫk−1n D(r
1ǫk−1
n ‖rǫk−1n ) + pˆM,0ǫk−1n D(r0ǫk−1n ‖rǫk−1n )
]− O(logn).
(16)
Therefore the growth rate of the Markovian strategy of order k is larger than that of order
k − 1 by the amount shown on the right-hand side.
Next we consider block strategies. For j = 0, 1, define
pˆj|ǫk−1n =
pˆ
M,ǫk−1j
n
pˆ
M,ǫk−1
n
, ρj|ǫk−1 =
{
ρ, if j = 1
1− ρ, if j = 0.
Then∑
ǫk∈{0,1}k
pˆM,ǫkn log
pˆM,ǫkn
ρǫk
=
∑
ǫk∈{0,1}k−1
pˆM,ǫk−1n
1∑
j=0
pˆj|ǫk−1n log
pˆ
j|ǫk−1
n
ρj|ǫk−1
+
∑
ǫk∈{0,1}k−1
pˆM,ǫk−1n log
pˆ
M,ǫk−1
n
ρǫk−1
.
Now pˆ
1|ǫk−1
n = r
ǫk−1
n and under the the assumption of homogeneity with respect to shifts,
the relative frequency pˆǫkn of ǫk is the same for different shifts a and this implies that
pˆ
ǫk−1
n = pˆ
M,ǫk−1
n + o(1). Therefore
D
({pˆǫkn } ∥∥ {ρǫk}) = ∑
ǫk∈{0,1}k
pˆM,ǫk−1n D
(
rǫk−1n ‖ρ
)
+D
({pˆǫk−1n } ∥∥ {ρǫk−1})+ o(1).
By induction on k we obtain
k logKB,kn = logKM,k−1n + (k − 1) logKB,k−1n + o(n) =
k−1∑
i=0
logKM,in + o(n),
or
logKB,kn =
1
k
k−1∑
i=0
logKM,in + o(n), (17)
where KM,0n = K0n is the capital process of the strategy based on sn only. In (16) we saw
that the growth rate of Markovian strategy is non-decreasing in k. It follows that under
the assumption of homogeneity with respect to shifts the growth rate of the block strategy
is also non-decreasing in k and furthermore the growth rate of the Markovian strategy of
order k − 1 is better than that of the block strategy of length k.
We should note that if the homogeneity does not hold, then the growth rate of the
block strategy of length k might be better than that of the Markovian strategy of order
k − 1. If we divide the initial capital into k equal parts corresponding to each shift, then
the combined capital process is the arithmetic average of the capital process for different
shifts. The growth rate of the combined capital equals the maximum of capital processes
for different shifts and the maximum might be better than that of the Markovian strategy
or order k− 1. The question of homogeneity comes up again in consideration of the asset
trading game in continuous time.
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3.4 Universal Bayesian Skeptic by mixture of priors
When we incorporate the strategies developed in the previous subsections, we get a strat-
egy which can exploit any block or Markovian patterns of any length deviating from
independent Bernoulli trials.
Let PB,k be the Bayesian strategy which exploits the k-th order block patterns con-
structed in Section 3.1, and let PM,k be the Bayesian strategy which exploits the k-th
order Markovian patterns constructed in Section 3.2. At first we divide the initial capital
K0 = 1 into equal two parts K0B = 1/2 and K0M = 1/2, and further divide K0B = 1/2
into countably infinite accounts with positive initial capitals cB1, cB2, . . . ,
∑∞
k=1 cBk = 1/2,
and also divide K0M = 1/2 similarly as cM1, cM2, . . . ,
∑∞
k=1 cMk = 1/2. We apply the
strategy PB,k to the k-th account cBk and apply the strategy PM,k to the k-th account
cMk, respectively. The resulting “universal” strategy
P∗ = P∗B + P∗M =
∞∑
k=1
cBkPB,k +
∞∑
k=1
cMkPM,k
can exploit any block or Markovian pattern of any length.
We shall formulate and state this fact within the framework of measure-theoretic
probability in order to clarify the connection to the universal source coding in information
theory. For simplicity of statement we consider the coin-tossing game with ρ = 1/2 and
use the base two logarithm. Let {pǫk} denote the k-dimensional probability distribution
of a random vector (X1, . . . , Xk) ∈ {0, 1}k. Then
1
log 2
D({pǫk}‖{ρǫk}) =
∑
ǫk∈{0,1}k
pǫk log2
pǫk
2−k
= k −H(X1, . . . , Xk),
where H(X1, . . . , Xk) denotes the entropy of {pǫk}. For an infinite sequence X1, X2, . . .
of stationary and ergodic 0-1 random variables, the entropy H(X ) = H(X1, X2, . . . )
is defined as H(X ) = limk(1/k)H(X1, . . . , Hk). Under the assumption of stationarity
and ergodicity, each k-dimensional empirical distribution converges to the probability
distribution {pǫk} almost surely. Furthermore in the previous subsection we saw that
larger block sizes achieve better growth rates. Therefore, arguing as in Chapter 13 of [1]
we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1. If X1, X2, . . . , are stationary and ergodic sequence of 0-1 random vari-
ables, then
1
n
log2KP
∗
n → 1−H(X ), a.s. (n→∞).
Thus we can say that KP∗n → ∞ achieves the optimal rate in the sense of universal
source coding in information theory.
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4 Application to asset trading games in continuous
time
In this section we apply the results on the block strategy of length two and the first-order
Markovian strategy of the previous section to an asset trading game in continuous time
considered in [16]. It should be noted that our interest here is to derive explicit growth
rates of our strategies applied to the asset trading game, rather than a rigorous treatment
of forcing of the variation exponent of two. Therefore in our derivation we proceed with
informal definitions and convenient regularity conditions.
In Section 4.1 we summarize the setup of an asset trading game. In Section 4.2
we obtain growth rates of our strategies for the asset trading game when the variation
exponent of the asset price path deviates from two.
4.1 Preliminaries on asset trading games in continuous time
Here we summarize preliminary facts on the asset trading game as formulated in [16]. Our
framework in [16] is now much generalized in the recent papers of Vovk ([17],[18],[19]).
Suppose that there is a financial asset which is traded in continuous time. Let S(t)
denote the price of the unit amount of the asset at time t. We assume that S(t) is positive
and a continuous function of t. The price path S(·) is chosen by a player “Market”,
which is the same as Reality in the coin-tossing game. “Investor” enters the market at
time t = t0 = 0 with the initial capital of K(0) = 1. He decides discrete time points
0 = t0 < t1 < t2 < · · · to trade the financial asset. The trading time ti and the amount
Mi of the asset Investor holds for the interval [ti, ti+1) can depend on the path of S(t) up
to time ti.
The basic fact on the behavior of S(t) is the “
√
dt-effect” ([20], [16]), which asserts that
infinitesimal increments |dS(t)| of the price path have to be of the order O(√dt), in the
sense that otherwise Investor can make arbitrarily large profit without risking bankruptcy.
When |dS(t)| = O((dt)H), thenH ∈ (0, 1] is called the Ho¨lder exponent or the Hurst index
of S(t), and 1/H is called the variation exponent. Thus the game-theoretic statement of√
dt-effect is that Investor can force the variation exponent of two.
We consider “limit order” strategy of Investor. Let δ > 0 be a constant. Investor
determines the trading times t1, t2, . . . as follows. After ti is determined, let ti+1 be the
first time after ti when either
S(ti+1)
S(ti)
= 1 + δ or =
1
1 + δ
(18)
happens. This procedure leads to a discrete time coin-tossing game embedded into the
asset trading game as follows. Let
xn =
(1 + δ)S(tn+1)− S(tn)
δ(2 + δ)S(tn)
=
{
1, if S(tn+1) = S(tn)(1 + δ)
0, if S(tn+1) = S(tn)/(1 + δ),
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and
ρ = ρδ =
1
2 + δ
.
Also write K˜n = K(tn+1). Clearly xn can be thought as “heads” or “tails” chosen by
Market after the time ti. More formally we define the following protocol of an embedded
discrete time coin-tossing game.
Embedded Discrete Time Coin-Tossing Game
Protocol:
K˜0 := 1.
FOR n = 1, 2, . . . :
Investor announces νn ∈ R.
Market announces xn ∈ {0, 1}.
K˜n = K˜n−1(1 + νn(xn − ρ)).
END FOR
This embedded discrete time game allows us to apply results on coin-tossing games
to the asset trading game in continuous time. The amount Mi of the asset held during
[ti, ti+1) is determined by our strategies in Section 3. From now on we fix the time interval
[0, T ] of the asset trading game. Then the total number rounds n = n(δ) played in the
embedded coin-tossing game is finite. For a given path, n(δ) is increased by letting δ ↓ 0
in (18). n(δ) diverges to infinity as δ ↓ 0, unless S(t) is constant on [0, T ]. We call
a strategy with small δ a high-frequency strategy. In [16] we applied high-frequency
Bayesian strategy of [7] to the embedded discrete time game and proved that Investor can
force the variation exponent of two, within an arbitrary small constant.
However the Bayesian strategy of [7] is based only on sn and does not take the higher
order patterns of the increments of S(t) into account. In the previous section we saw
that multistep Bayesian strategies can effectively exploit higher order patterns when Re-
ality’s moves are not random. Therefore it is of interest to investigate how fast Investor
can increase his capital by a high-frequency multistep Bayesian strategy, if the variation
exponent of S(t) deviates from two.
4.2 Growth rates of block strategy of length two and first-order
Markov strategy for asset trading game
In this section we derive growth rates of high-frequency block strategy of length two and
first-order Markov strategy in the embedded coin-tossing game. Our results are stated in
two propositions at the end of this section.
Write η = log(1 + δ). Then η ↓ 0 is equivalent to δ ↓ 0. We decrease η to zero as
ηk = 2
−k, k = 1, 2, . . . .
The advantage of taking this sequence of ηk is that the equi-spaced grids for log S(t)
are completely nested in k and we can establish some important relations between the
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empirical distributions of block patterns for different k (see Lemma 4.1 below). We call
the embedded coin-tossing game with ηk the k-th embedded coin-tossing game. Let n(ηk)
denote the total number of rounds of the k-th embedded coin-tossing game. For notational
convenience we sometimes write n or nk instead of n(ηk). As in Section 3.1, let m
ij
nk/2
,
i, j = 0, 1, denote the number of pairs (ij) among (x1x2)(x3x4) . . . in the k-th embedded
coin-tossing game. For the shift of one, let m˜ijnk/2 denote the number of pairs (ij) among
(x2x3)(x4x5) . . . in the k-th embedded coin-tossing game. For these counts of pairs, it
is more precise to write mij[nk/2] or m˜
ij
[(nk−1)/2]
. However for simplicity we write mijnk/2 or
m˜ijnk/2 in the following. We define q
i
nk
, qijnk as in Section 3.2.
We now give a preliminary consideration on the behavior of counts n(ηk), q
i
nk
, qijnk ,
mijnk/2, m˜
ij
nk/2
for different k. At this point it is helpful to consider properties of fractional
Brownian motion (Chapter 4 of [3]). Let {BH(t)} denote the fractional Brownian motion
of Hurst index H . BH(t) corresponds to logS(t) in the asset trading game. BH(t) is
a typical stochastic process with |dBH(t)| = O((dt)H). {BH(t)} is self-similar, i.e., for
every a > 0 the distribution of {BH(at)} coincides with that of {aHBH(t)}. This implies
that making the grid finer as ηk → ηk/2 is equivalent (in distribution) to increasing T as
T → 21/HT . This suggests that when Market chooses a path S(t) with a fixed exponent
H , then
nk+1 ≃ 21/Hnk. (19)
Furthermore {BH(t)} has stationary increments, i.e., the distribution of the increments
of {BH(t)} are invariant with respect to arbitrary time shift. This corresponds to our as-
sumption of homogeneity with respect to the shifts in Section 3.3. Under the homogeneity
assumption we expect
2mijnk/2 ≃ 2m˜
ij
nk/2
≃ qijnk . (20)
Also note the following trivial combinatorial relations for any n:
q11n + q
01
n = q
1
n − x1, q11n + q10n = q1n − xn and |q01n − q10n | = |xn − x1| ≤ 1.
From game-theoretic viewpoint Investor can force H = 1/2. If Market chooses a path
with H 6= 1/2, then the notion of forcing can not be applied and there is no guarantee that
(19) and (20) hold. However even for H 6= 1/2 we use (19), (20) as convenient regularity
conditions for evaluating the growth rates of our strategies in view of the properties of
the fractional Brownian motion. In Proposition 4.1 and Proposition 4.2 below we obtain
the growth rate of the first-order Markovian strategy and block strategy of length two
under these conditions. In these propositions the approximate equalities in (19) and (20)
are understood in the sense that the ratios two sides converge to 1.
Now we state the following crucial combinatorial fact.
Lemma 4.1. For each path S(t) and for each k
m11nk/2 = q
1
nk−1
, m00nk/2 = q
0
nk−1
.
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Proof. Consider two nested equi-spaced grids with intervals ηk−1 and ηk = ηk−1/2. For the
grid with the interval ηk−1, consider a step, where the price is going upward from ti to ti+1
i.e. log S(ti+1) = log S(ti) + ηk−1 in (18). It is obvious that this upward step corresponds
exactly to two consecutive upward steps for the the grid with the interval ηk. Therefore
m11nk/2 = q
1
nk−1
. By counting downward steps, we similarly obtain m00nk/2 = q
0
nk−1
.
We now derive the growth rate of the first-order Markovian strategy. Define
TV (ηk, T ) =
nk∑
i=1
| logS(ti)− logS(ti−1)| = nkηk = (q1nk + q0nk)ηk,
L(ηk, T ) = log S(tnk)− logS(0) = (q1nk − q0nk)ηk.
Under (19), nk+1ηk+1 ≃ 21/H−1nkηk. Therefore nk+1ηk+1 → ∞ as k → ∞ for the case
H < 1. On the other hand S(tnk)→ S(T ) as k →∞ and L(ηk, T )→ log S(T )− log S(0).
Therefore for each path, L(ηk, T )/TV (ηk, T )→ 0 as k →∞ and this implies that
q1nk
nk
→ 1
2
(k →∞). (21)
Also note that 1/2 = limδ→0 ρδ.
Furthermore by Lemma 4.1, under (19)
q11nk ≃ 2m11nk/2 = 2q1nk−1 ≃ nk−1.
Therefore
r1nk =
q11nk
q1nk
≃ nk−1
nk/2
≃ 1
21/H−1
.
Similarly r0nk = q
01
nk
/q0nk ≃ 1 − 1/21/H−1. Let KMnk denote the capital of the first-order
Markovian strategy at the end of the k-th embedded coin-tossing game. By (12) we
obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose that Market chooses a path such that
1 = lim
k→∞
nk+1
21/Hnk
= lim
k→∞
2mijnk/2
qijnk
= lim
k→∞
2m˜ijnk/2
qijnk
, i, j = 0, 1.
Then
lim
k→∞
1
nk
logKMnk = D
( 1
21/H−1
∥∥∥1
2
)
.
We now consider the block strategy of length two. Let KBnk denote the capital of block
strategy at the end of the k-th embedded coin-tossing game. By (17) we know that logKBnk
is the average of logKM,1nk and logKM,0nk . However by (21) the growth rate of KM,0nk is zero.
Therefore we have the following result.
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Proposition 4.2. Under the same assumption as in Proposition 4.1
lim
k→∞
1
nk
logKBnk =
1
2
D
( 1
21/H−1
∥∥∥1
2
)
.
Therefore the growth rate of the block strategy is half of rate of the Markovian strategy.
KM,0nk is the capital process of the strategy based only on the past average of Reality’s moves
considered in [16], whose growth rate is zero. It is of interest to note that despite this
zero growth rate, the strategy in [16] was sufficient to force the variation exponent of two
of the Market’s path. This suggests that looking for a simple strategy for forcing certain
event and looking for a more aggressive strategy with a better growth rate need different
considerations.
5 Discussions
In this paper we studied multistep Bayesian strategies for coin-tossing games. Our general
conclusion was that asymptotically we obtain better growth rates by incorporating larger
block sizes for block strategies or longer orders for Markovian strategies. However this
conclusion has to be taken with the following cautions. When the main growth term
expressed in terms of the Kullback divergence is close to zero, we have to compare this
to the term of order O(logn). Generally the term of order O(logn) can be understood
as a penalty term for larger models, i.e., for using strategies incorporating larger blocks.
Therefore if the coin-tossing game is played only a finite number of rounds, or Reality does
not deviate too much from the independent Bernoulli trials, then it might be advantageous
to use shorter block sizes. This is essentially the same tradeoff as in statistical model
selection based on various information criteria. It is of great interest to consider selecting
among strategies or dynamically adjusting weights for them.
For convenience we made the assumption of homogeneity for block strategies in Section
3.3 and in Section 4. We initially thought that homogeneity can be “forced” on Reality
by appropriate strategies of Skeptic. However, when Reality deviates from independent
Bernoulli trials, the game-theoretic notion of forcing can not be applied. Intuitively it
seems that Skeptic can further exploit patterns in Reality’s moves when the homogeneity
with respect to shifts does not hold. However at present it seems difficult to formulate
results in this direction.
In Section 3.4 we considered an infinite countable mixture of block strategies and
Markovian strategies. Using this countable mixture, Skeptic can asymptotically exploit
any deviation of Reality’s moves from independent Bernoulli trials. We pointed out that
the idea of the universal source coding in information theory is similar. Our result is
also very closely connected to results in algorithmic theory of randomness. We can think
of each component strategy as a test of randomness of Reality’s moves. In algorithmic
randomness there are strong computability restrictions on the allowed sample spaces.
In the game-theoretic approach we do not have to worry about computability and by
appropriate discretization it is now possible to discuss the randomness of continuous
paths.
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In Section 4.2 we only considered block strategies of length two and first-order Marko-
vian strategies in the embedded coin-tossing game. We could obtain the explicit descrip-
tions for the growth rates in Proposition 4.1 and Proposition 4.2 because of the combi-
natorial fact of Lemma 4.1. It is of interest to investigate growth rates of higher-order
Markovian strategies in the asset trading game.
For measure-theoretic stochastic processes, the regularity conditions assumed in Propo-
sitions 4.1 and 4.2 are basically law of large numbers, and we expect that they hold for
fractional Brownian motions. However the trading times in (18) are stopping times and
the fractional Brownian motion for H 6= 1/2 is not a Markov process. Therefore it is not
easy to prove that the regularity conditions hold for fractional Brownian motions.
A Equivalence of Bayesian strategy and prudent strat-
egy in coin-tossing games
Here we establish a one-to-one correspondence between Skeptic’s prudent strategy and a
probability distribution on the set of paths Ξ in the coin-tossing game.
For one direction suppose that Skeptic models Reality’s moves by a probability distri-
bution Q. Write αn = Mn/Kn−1. Given Kn−1 assume that Skeptic tries to maximize the
conditional expected value of logKn. It is equivalent to maximizing
pn log(1 + αn(1− ρ)) + (1− pn) log(1− αnρ) (22)
with respect to αn, where pn = p
Q
n is given in (3). The maximizing value of αn is uniquely
given as
αn =
pn − ρ
ρ(1− ρ) .
With this αn,
Kn =
{
Kn−1pn/ρ, if xn = 1
Kn−1(1− pn)/(1− ρ), if xn = 0.
Note that Kn = 0 if either pn = 0 and xn = 1 or pn = 1 and xn = 0. In this case Skeptic
can not play any more. For other cases he can keep playing the game. It should be noted
that this is consistent with the definition of conditional probability in (3), namely, Skeptic
can continue the game if and only if (3) is defined. We have shown that a probability
distribution Q leads to the strategy given in (4).
For another direction let P be a prudent strategy of Skeptic. Starting with the initial
capital of K0 = 1, define
Q1(1) = ρ+M1ρ(1− ρ) = ρ(1 +M1(1− ρ)),
Q1(0) = 1− ρ−M1ρ(1− ρ) = (1− ρ)(1−M1ρ).
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Then Q1(0) and Q1(1) are non-negative and 1 = Q1(0)+Q1(1). For the case Kn−1(ξn−1) >
0 recursively define
Qn(ξ
n−11) = ρQn−1(ξ
n−1)
(
1 +
Mn(ξ
n−1)
Kn−1(ξn−1)(1− ρ)
)
,
Qn(ξ
n−10) = (1− ρ)Qn−1(ξn−1)
(
1− Mn(ξ
n−1)
Kn−1(ξn−1)ρ
)
.
These are non-negative and satisfy the consistency condition (2). If Kn−1(ξn−1) = 0, then
define 0 = Qn(ξ
n−11) = Qn(ξ
n−10), which is also consistent. By this procedure a Skeptic’s
prudent strategy leads to a probability distribution P 7→ Q.
By construction it is obvious that this map is the inverse map to (4) and therefore
there exists a one-to-one correspondence between the set of probability distributions and
the set of Skeptic’s strategies satisfying the collateral duty.
Finally we state the following Bayesian optimality result, which follows easily from
the maximization in (22)
Proposition A.1. Let Q be a probability distribution on Ξ and let P be the strategy
corresponding to Q. For any other strategy P˜
EQ(logKPQn ) ≥ EQ(logKP˜n ).
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